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In our early discussions on the bomber sectionof The Crucible of War, the third volume of
the official history of the Royal Canadian Air
Force, Ben Greenhous and I wondered whether
we should adopt a chronological or topical
organisation. I preferred the latter; Ben the
former. He was the principal author; he got his
way – he was right, of course, I now admit freely;
and his instructions to me were “to write an
account of Bomber Command and the strategic
bombing offensive on a chronological basis
weaving in issues of tactics, technology,
operations, morale, equipment, air battles, and
policy as tightly as Goretex cloth.” We agreed,
however, that I could begin by doing topical
narratives, because I would have to know the
full story of these topics, as it were, in context,
in order to weave them into a chronological
account. I knew where I could find the bombing
policy story from Puble Record Office documents
and the Harris and Portal papers; and it was
there, implicitly, in Webster and Frankland. But
there was no consistent study of gun turrets,
German air defences, bombsights, and the two
main British heavy bombers – at least, none that
were going to help me. So I did research on these
topics in London and here in Ottawa and did
the narratives and then incorporated both detail
and my conclusions into the text. The beauty of
it was that having done all that primary research
on these topics to produce the narratives long
before I tried to write the chapters, I was really
well prepared to handle these issues.
The Halifax/Lancaster controversy was, of
course, central to any Canadian book on the
bomber offensive because of the traditional
allegations that Harris was all too prepared to
give Canadian squadrons clapped-out, second-
rate aircraft. I had to know how clapped out
Halifaxes were; and I had to find out whether
the allocation of aircraft was biased along
national lines. What I found was that Harris
exaggerated somewhat; that he did not allocate
aircraft on national lines; and, perhaps not
surprisingly, that bomber crews who survived a
tour on Halifaxes were quite happy with their
aircraft. Why not? They made it through. So, they
talked about its robustness: that they came
home, in some cases, with damage that would
have destroyed a Lancaster. Lancaster pilots
talked about its superior performance, that let
them fly above all those poor Hally drivers three
thousand feet below.
In the end, Robert Linnell, the producer of
Warriors of the Night and Last Flight to Berlin,
undertook a film documentary on the Halifax in
conjunction with the Trenton restoration project.
He found a Handley Page aviation engineer who
said that he should use modern technology to
test what he believed had been, in retrospect, a
design problem that had inhibited the Halifax’s
performance: something which, as I understand
it, could not have been known at the time. I do
not know the details, but Bob Linnell said that
when they tested the guy’s theory, it proved to
be accurate. Oftentimes we decry documentary
film producers for their shoddy work. But in this
case, Linnell, who began his work while we were
doing Crucible and kept in touch with me, took
official history work and, after ten years of
searching, found someone who could answer his
question – and mine: far too late for the official
history.  Harris had been right – there was a
design problem that limited the Halifax’s
performance, but it never could have been found
or corrected at the time.
The Halifax and Lancaster
in Canadian Service
Stephen J. Harris
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6So, what follows is the research report that I
compiled and then used to deal with the Halifax
issue in the official history.
* * * * *
When war broke out in September 1939,Bomber Command was equipped, or about
to be equipped, with aircraft designed to meet
Air Ministry requirements set down between
1932 and 1936. The Handley-Page Hampden and
Vickers Wellington derived from Specification
B.9/32, calling for a twin-engine day bomber; the
Armstrong-Whitworth Whitley from Specification
B.3/34, which asked for an experimental twin-
engine heavy night bomber; the Blenheim from
Specification B.28/35, which allowed for
modification of the civilian Bristol Type 142 as
a fast bomber; and the Short Stirling from
Specification B.12/36. (Although as might be
obvious, perhaps it is worthwhile to point out
that the last number in a Specification, eg. /36
indicates the year in which the specification was
issued.)
The latter was the first Air Ministry
specification for a four-engined bomber, capable
of reaching targets anywhere in Western Europe.
It called for a minimum range of at least 3,000
miles, a speed of 230 miles per hour at 15,000
feet (the anticipated bombing altitude given the
bombsights of the day), a service ceiling no lower
than 28,000 feet, and a maximum bomb load
over shorter distances of 14,000 pounds, falling
to 2,000 over greater ranges. Had these
specifications been met, Bomber Command
would have had a first-class machine available
in 1940, but the Stirling fell far short in several
crucial areas. Its service ceiling was 16,500 feet
(raised to 17,000 in the Mark III), which was
lethal in heavy Flak, and it never achieved the
speeds desired at normal bombing altitudes –
which proved to be lower still than the service
ceiling. Indeed, Stirling losses were such that,
by 1943, the type had to be withdrawn from
operations over Germany.1
The standards called for in these
specifications more or less established the
theoretical limits of what Bomber Command
would be capable of in the first few years of the
war. But it should not be thought that the Air
Ministry or Bomber Command had fixed on them
as satisfying all or even most of their immediate
or long-term requirements. Specification P.13/
36, for example, called for a twin-engined
medium bomber capable of carrying 8,000
pounds of bombs, clearly an advance over the
Hampden, Blenheim, Whitley, and Wellington,2
while B.19/38, subsequently renumbered B.1/39
in March 1939, looked to the development of a
four-engined machine, for use in all parts of the
world, which would replace all existing medium
and heavy bombers. It was to have a minimum
speed of 280 miles per hour at 15,000 feet, a
range of at least 2,500 miles and carry a
minimum bomb load of 9,000 pounds. Defensive
armament was also to be upgraded substantially
over current standards, with eight Hispano 20
mm cannon housed, four each, in the dorsal and
ventral turrets.3
Specification B.1/39 in particular met many
of the recommendations made in the air staff’s
and Bomber Command’s own investigation of
the “ideal bomber,”4 but neither it nor P.13/36
produced the anticipated results. The engines
intended for the latter were failures, while B.1/
39 was cancelled in May 1940 by Lord
Beaverbrook to allow the aircraft industry to
concentrate production on existing types to meet
the immediate German threat. Despite the lifting
of such restrictions on the development of new
designs the following year, the British aircraft
industry was thrown off balance, and subsequent
specifications bore little fruit until 1943, when
B.14/43 resulted in the Avro Lincoln. But none
of these four-engined heavy bombers were ready
for operations before late 1945, some months
after the Japanese surrender.5 Moreover, the
Lincoln could not be considered as belonging to
the same generation as the American B-29 or
the final few bomber designs produced in
Germany.
Although they were not proceeded with, the
specifications issued between spring 1941 and
B.14/43 still deserve some attention. Not only
do they indicate the development of Air Ministry
thought with regard to bombing, but perhaps
more important, they may – this is speculation
– have provided Bomber Command with a
constant reminder of what might have been
possible in the best of all possible worlds.
Specification B.5/41 (which was succeeded by
B.3/42 issued on 8 December 1942) aimed, for
example, at the design and development of a high
altitude, pressurised heavy bomber with a
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7service ceiling of 38,500 feet, a speed of 345
miles per hour at 31,000 feet, a bomb load of
8,000 pounds, and remote-controlled, cannon-
equipped, and radar-directed barbettes as
defensive armament – a machine that would have
been comparable in every respect to the
American B-29. Vickers took up the challenge
and produced, in the words of one authority, “the
most elegant of British heavy bomber designs,”
and one which was “the ultimate expression of
British concepts for piston-engine design in its
class.”6 But the third – and last – prototype of
A Handley-Page Halifax Mark I or II of 405 Squadron RCAF, with early style
vertical stabilizers and the nose-mounted Boulton Paul turret, in flight.
An Avro Lancaster I.
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8the Windsor, as this type was known, did not fly
until 11 July 1944, and even then the problems
of designing and producing the defensive
barbettes had not been solved. Work ceased
before further progress was made.7 Short
Brothers were also involved in a proposal to
create a Super Stirling (under Specification B.8/
41) to carry 10,000 pounds of bombs at 300
miles per hour over 4,000 miles, but it too was
cancelled.8
The reasons why these specifications failed
to produce operational aircraft are complex. The
tone of Correlli Barnett’s The Audit of War9
suggests that the British aircraft industry as
organised and managed between 1939 and 1945
was not capable of designing, developing and
producing new types while trying to meet current
commitments to furnish the operational
commands with what they required. I suspect,
too, that the rules governing the allocation of
labour and materials to the British aviation
industry established by the Ministry of Aircraft
Production (MAP) meant that it was always easier
to increase production of current types than it
was to convince the MAP bureaucracy of the need
to introduce new equipment. The fact that, from
late 1941, Winston Churchill consistently
demanded significant increases in the current
strength of Bomber Command undoubtedly
reinforced this tendency. Finally, it also happened
that by 1941-1942 Bomber Command was being
supplied with two types of aircraft which, with
suitable modification, seemed capable of
satisfying enough of the Air Ministry’s and
Bomber Command’s basic requirements that
having to live with them did not appear to involve
great sacrifice.
These two designs, the Handley-Page Halifax
and Avro Lancaster, both evolved from the P.13/
36 specification for a twin-engined bomber and
the subsequent failure of the Vulture engine
designed for them. The Handley-Page H.P.56 was
cancelled before it got off the ground in 1937, a
new H.P.57 with four Rolls-Royce Merlins and a
larger fuselage was substituted, the prototypes
flying in October 1939 and August 1940, and
the Halifax entered squadron service on 23
November 1940 – a simple, straight-forward, and
seemingly effortless progression.10 The path from
the Avro P.13/36 design – the Manchester – to its
Lancaster successor was not nearly so direct.
At first it was hoped that a two-engined machine
Marshalling of the Hallies – Paul Goranson
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9could still be proceeded with, using either
Centaurus or Sabre engines instead of the
Vulture, but when these proved to have their own
faults A.V. Roe moved ahead with a four-engined
variant using Rolls-Royce Merlin Xs. This was
opposed by Handley-Page, and was not
supported at first by the Ministry of Aircraft
Production, which was hoping to standardise on
one four-engine design and which, for the
moment, was well satisfied with the Halifax’s
potential. Moreover, Merlins were in great
demand for the Spitfire and Hurricane as well
as the Halifax. But with the connivance of Rolls-
Royce and a certain amount of scrounging for
materials, the Avro team led by Roy Chadwick
had the prototype Lancaster ready for its maiden
flight on 9 January 1941. The trials were
successful, and the subsequent evaluation at
Boscombe Down so positive, that immediate
production orders resulted.11 Operational service
commenced that December.
For a number of reasons, therefore,
qualitative improvement in Bomber Command
during the Second World War came primarily
through modification of the Halifax and
Lancaster, rather than as a result of the
introduction of wholly new types. The rest of this
research narrative will look at the kinds of
modifications demanded by Bomber Command,
and the extent to which they were accepted (and,
where possible, why) by the Air Ministry and
MAP.
* * * * *
That the Handley-Page Halifax was somethingless than an unqualified success was
apparent before its first operational flight in
March 1941, and even more so thereafter.
Whether the flaws discovered in this period were
attributable to the process of converting an
original design for a two-engined machine to the
larger four-engined version, or simply occurred
in the nature of things, is not entirely clear; but
they were well known by the summer, and led to
a number of modifications in the type even before
the Mark II variant entered service with No.35
Squadron in October.
Some involved crew comfort. Draughts from
the beam guns, the ventral turret, and leaks in
the bomb bay doors, fuselage, and wing seams
could be unbearable. Other problems were more
serious, and involved the basic airworthiness of
the type. The ailerons were heavy and sluggish
above 250 miles per hour and also whenever the
aircraft was pitched at a sharp angle. The
wooden aileron flaps tended to warp which
provided somewhat less than predictable
responses. In addition, the rudders had an
unnerving tendency to overbalance below 150
miles per hour, and any time the engines were
throttled back, causing them to lock on and
eventually produce a spiral dive from which it
was difficult to recover. Below 120 miles per hour
it was often difficult to obtain any response
whatsoever.12 This could be deadly to an aircraft
returning home with battle damage, flying on two
or three engines (when rudder overbalancing was
common), or during evasive action. Furthermore,
the measures required of a pilot to compensate
for rudder overbalancing were, in themselves,
almost self-defeating. Although much of the
problem was caused by the inadequate design
of the rudder itself, the rudder controls had a
very light touch compared to all others.
Accordingly, as the pilot fought to gain control
of his aircraft by manipulating everything
possible, there was “a natural tendency” for a
pilot to overcorrect and make the situation even
worse.13
Attempts to fix these problems were made
early, and often. Body and bomb bay leaks were
sealed; metal aileron flaps became available in
August 1941; modified trim tabs were introduced
to improve rudder response; and the fuselage
itself was strengthened.14 But even the Mark I
variants incorporating these modifications
suffered from an even more fundamental
problem. The Merlin X engines which powered
almost all of them were underpowered and had
to be overworked when pilots manoeuvred
violently or fought for altitude.
The Mark II Halifax, which entered squadron
service in October 1941, was fitted with the more
powerful Merlin XX engine, but this was not an
altogether happy development as it had a habit
of failing on long-range flights. Similarly, while
the Boulton Paul C Mk II mid-upper turret, which
replaced the draughty ventral gun positions, may
have reduced the amount of cold air leaking into
the aircraft, it was extremely bulky and created
considerable drag, which reduced performance
further.15
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Most important, however, the modifications
to the rudder assembly attempted so far had not
stopped overbalancing, while some of them,
adopted piecemeal, actually exacerbated the
situation by causing new problems. The
installation of a bulbous “nose” on the rudder,
for example, led to difficulty in maintaining trim.
Furthermore, by fall it was found that the
deterioration in performance of the Halifax II,
“consequent upon progressive application of
external equipment,” had gone so far that the
aircraft was “incapable of meeting concurrently
the operational requirements of both high
loading and high altitude cruising.” This
“external equipment” included, among other
things, a heavy coat of camouflage paint, and
fittings for 4,000 pound bombs which left the
bomb bay doors partially open in flight.16
Despite the persistent design and structural
problems which plagued the Halifax almost from
the first flight of the prototype – and of which
some seemed beyond remedy in the early months
of 1942 – the alternative of concentrating on the
Lancaster instead was not yet feasible. Although
prototypes of the four-engined Manchester III/
Lancaster I had been flying since January 1941,
and production models powered by the Merlin
XX (the same engine selected for the Halifax II)
since October, A.V. Roe’s design was not without
flaws. Skin wrinkling, and difficulties with both
the wing tips and the front spars on upper wing
surfaces, had been identified as the cause of fatal
accidents early in 1942.17
These were soon corrected, but an Air
Fighting Development Unit (AFDU) report on the
Lancaster issued 30 May 1942 noted some
additional difficulties. Although the Lancaster,
with its Merlin XX, was powerful and
manoeuvrable, promising more than the Halifax,
the test pilots believed that operational crews
would require considerable experience on the
type before they would be capable, routinely, of
putting their machine through the violent turns
and dives necessary to avoid Flak and fighters.
In addition, the design of the nose gunner’s
position was “extremely inconvenient.” Lacking
a foot rest, the gunner was likely, “in moments
of stress,” to “tread on the bomb-aimer’s head.”
Beyond that, the AFDU expressed its concern
about whether the Lancaster, armed with only
.303 machine guns, had any chance of surviving
in daylight operations – a valid, but for the
moment irrelevant, caveat.18
It should be noted that the possibility of
substituting Lancasters for Halifaxes had been
raised in July 1941, a year before the AFDU
report was issued and only two months after the
first prototype Lancaster flew. But the reason
for broaching the issue at this time had nothing
to do with any dissatisfaction with the Halifax.
Indeed, it was precisely because there “appeared
to be little difference in performance” between
the two that the matter was raised at all, and
then only on account of “engine
considerations.”19 With the possibility that the
allocation of both Merlin and Hercules engines
to bomber aircraft could be affected by
production shortfalls or competing demands
from Fighter Command, it was important to
know whether priority could be given to either
of the two heavy bombers. This was possible once
it was clear that they had equal potential.
But reordering of production priorities for
any reason other than shortfalls in the supply of
component parts was not acceptable in the
summer of 1941, particularly if it raised the
possibility of a reduction in the total output of
bomber aircraft. Prime Minister Churchill was
“deeply concerned” in July 1941 when the
forecasts he was receiving showed that there
would be no appreciable strengthening of
Bomber Command by the end of 1942, and
concluded that this would cost the RAF “all
possibility of decisive predominance
indispensable to victory.” As a result, he
preferred that production of existing, “well tried”
bomber types should increase – even those able
to make only shallow penetrations into Germany.
“A machine good enough to carry two tons to the
Ruhr,” he told Beaverbrook, Sinclair and Portal,
“ought to have a long run in continuous
production before it is discarded.”20
Consequently, even Whitley’s and Blenheims
received a new lease on life.
Unease about the Halifax had increased
considerably a year later. Bomber Command’s
Operational Research Section was convinced, for
example, that a significant number of the
Halifaxes which failed to return from operations
between July 1941 and June 1942 had been lost
because of the type’s poor flight and handling
characteristics: it had difficulty gaining altitude,
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miserable manoeuvrability at altitude, too little
speed for evasive turns, and a nasty tendency to
roll over if the turrets were rotated (to follow a
night fighter) while the pilot was engaging in
evasive manoeuvres.21 Moreover, the exhaust
shrouds were so ineffective that Halifaxes could
be seen from as far away as five hundred yards
from dead astern. Unhappily, Portal informed
the prime minister, finding ways to reduce the
visibility of exhaust flames was a major problem
of “considerable difficulty.”22
The next month saw the beginning of what
would become Air Marshal Harris’s long
campaign to rid Bomber Command of the Halifax
(and, quite likely, any other aircraft designed and
built by Handley-Page, a firm for which he had
had little sympathy since he first saw the
Hampden)23 and to concentrate all bomber
production on the Lancaster instead.24 Failing
that, he was determined to “get to the bottom of
Halifax vulnerability” which, together with the
posting of some aircrew to the Middle East, had
recently forced No.4 Group to be taken off
operations. So far as Harris was concerned, the
vulnerability was explained easily: by the “poor
performance of an overloaded aircraft.”25
The issue was addressed again on 2
September, during the second meeting of the
committee struck to co-ordinate the bomber
offensive. Harris had two suggestions. First, he
asked whether it was possible to substitute 1,300
Lancasters for the 1,800 Halifaxes then
scheduled to be built – a proposal which Portal
found interesting, and perhaps even “an
extremely good bargain” given the Lancaster’s
better casualty record and its higher payload.
MAP undertook to study the question. Harris
then noted, however, that the superiority of the
Lancaster depended entirely upon which Mark
was being discussed. For the Lancaster II,
equipped with Bristol Hercules radial engines,
was proving to be inferior to the Lancaster I in
almost every respect – range, ceiling and speed
at altitude – yet was scheduled to be produced
at the same rate as the I. Accordingly, he asked
whether the Merlin XXs to be installed in Halifax
airframes (as the Mark II) could be set aside for
Lancaster I production, and the Hercules meant
for the Lancaster II be transferred to the new
Halifax Mark III, which would then be used for
training, minelaying, “and operations in overseas
theatres where first rate performance is not a
vital operational necessity.”26
A Handley-Page Halifax Mark III of 426 Squadron at dispersal.
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Halifax losses on operations (and in flying
accidents around Britain) continued at
unacceptably high levels during the fall of 1942.
Inadequate training of new pilots was discovered
to be one cause, but it was also apparent that
rudder overbalancing was still occurring
regularly – and fatally. Still more solutions were
attempted, most of them palliative, until the
aircraft testing establishment at Boscombe
Downe took two production models for more
extensive investigation. On 4 February 1943 one
of these dived, went into a flat spin, and crashed,
its rudders having overbalanced so much that
the top half of one was discovered to have broken
away. Further study eventually produced the
larger, rectangular fins to be found on all Mark
III Halifaxes, and retrofitted to earlier Marks as
well. The problem of rudder overbalancing had
been solved.27
But this was not the only problem afflicting
the Halifax. In what has been called the
“Christmas-tree syndrome,” it, like most other
aircraft, had been fitted with a number of
additional external equipments – navigation
blisters, aerials, cable cutting devices on the
wings, and heavy coats of camouflage paint – that
added considerably to weight and drag. Much of
this additional equipment was removed in an
officially sanctioned clean-up of the Halifax
undertaken in the fall of 1942, but based on their
own experience some squadrons went even
further, removing the bulky Boulton Paul C
turrets, for example, or the armour plating
around certain crew areas. This clean-up did not
make up for the basic lack of power available
on the Mk II and V, but the modifications were
extended to, and improved, the Hercules-
powered Mark III when it entered service in July
1943.28
In the interim, however, Bomber Command
was saddled with a force of Halifaxes that not
only “stinks,” Harris told officials at the MAP,
but was also “definitely cracking” the morale of
his crews.29 An Operational Research Section
report issued on 31 October 1942 confirmed his
prejudice. Although the Halifax seemed to be
intercepted less often than the slower, and lower-
flying, Wellingtons and Stirlings, and even less
often than the Lancaster, once it was found by a
night fighter it was more likely to be attacked
than any other type – presumably because it
lacked power and manoeuvrability, but also,
perhaps, because its exhausts were visible so
clearly and from such a great distance. As a
result, it had the highest missing rate of all
bombers. The Lancaster, by comparison, was
being intercepted by night fighters twice as often
as the Halifax, but these interceptions developed
into attacks only 15 per cent of the time (as
opposed to the Halifax ’s 67 per cent) –
presumably, again, because of its “good
performance and manoeuvrability.” As a result,
the Lancaster loss rate was just half that of the
Halifax. (See Table 1)
Harris had every reason to be unhappy with
these figures. With half the future Lancasters
scheduled to be Mark IIs, which he had already
declared “unacceptable,” losses of that type were
Definition: An interception is defined as contact being made between a night-fighter and a bomber without an
attack necessarily developing, either because the night fighter could not follow its first contact (or saw a better
target), or because the bomber was able to evade the night-fighter.
Source: Operational Research Section, Bomber Command, Report 66, “Review of Sorties, losses, and interceptions
of Bomber Command aircraft in night operations during the period 1st August 1941 – 31st October 1942,” TNA
PRO AIR 14/364.
Table 1
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likely to rise, while Merlins were still being
wasted on the “deplorable” Halifax. “If we must
have Halifaxes at all,” he told Portal, “let them
be nothing but Halifax IIIs,” which might be of
some use on easier operations and undertaking
“those Naval demands for long range aircraft as
may be inflicted upon us.”30
One month later, at the third bomber
offensive co-ordination meeting, Harris
reiterated his earlier plea to reserve all Merlins
for the Lancaster (so that they would all be Is)
and channelling all Hercules to the Halifax
(making them all IIIs). Everyone present agreed.
Sinclair announced, in addition, that the Cabinet
was ready to authorise a wholesale conversion
of Stirling production to the Lancaster. However,
although Lord Cherwell supported Harris’s
request to convert Halifax production as well,
noting that the Halifax dropped .95 pounds of
bombs per man-hour of manufacture compared
to the Stirling’s 1.2 and the Lancaster’s 3.6,
Sinclair stated that the Cabinet was not prepared
to go that far, and would wait until the cost of
any such conversion programme was better
understood.31
Harris returned to the attack three weeks
later in yet another stiff lecture to Sinclair. The
Stirling and Halifax were both major worries,
he told the secretary of state, and together they
“presage disaster unless solutions are found.”
The manager at one Stirling factory, he
continued, was “an incompetent drunk,” while
Handley-Page was:
Always weeping crocodile tears in my house and
office, smarming his unconvincing assurances
all over me and leaving me with a mounting
certainty that nothing whatever ponderable is
being done to make his deplorable product
worthy for war or fit to meet those jeopardies
which confront our gallant crews. Nothing will
be done until H.-P. and his gang are kicked out,
lock, stock and barrel. Trivialities are all they
are attempting at present, with the deliberate
intent of postponing the main issue until we are
irretrievably committed…
Unless we can get these two vital factors of the
heavy bomber programme put right, and with
miraculous despatch, we are sunk. We cannot
do this by polite negotiation with these crooks
and incompetents. In Russia it would long ago
have been arranged with a gun, and to that extent
I am a fervid Communist! If I write strongly it is
because I feel strongly, as I know you do, for the
jeopardy my gallant crews and the compromising
of our only method of winning this war.32
Three days later, but surely not as a result
of this latest outburst, the first priority for labour
within the jurisdiction of the MAP was given over
to Lancaster production.33 This should have
pleased Harris, and in fact apart from a single
criticism about the way Handley-Page was
carrying out modifications, passed to Sinclair
on 29 January,34 the files are silent on the Halifax-
Lancaster issue until May 1943 when, on the
13th, Harris again criticized the manufacturer,
asserting that the only real improvement to have
been made to the Halifax over the past year was
the installation of a Perspex nose – which also
happened to reduce the bomber’s armament.
The crucial problem, he continued, was the
inadequate flame damping mechanism on all
models.35
Harris had legitimate cause for concern
about the Halifax II/V and the Lancaster II, and
his proposal to do away with these types through
the relatively simple expedient of switching
engine allocations made considerable sense.
Similarly, so long as a reduction in the total
bomber production could be accepted, there was
logic in his recommendation to shut down the
Halifax programme altogether and to concentrate
exclusively on the Lancaster – although given his
opinion of the Lancaster II, there would obviously
have been a surplus of Hercules engines had this
advice been taken. If that could not be arranged,
restricting Halifaxes to easier targets, leaving
deep penetrations to the Lancaster, was always
possible – as Harris himself had acknowledged
some time before. But by now he was wedded to
a massive bombing offensive against German
cities and wanted the largest bomber force
possible to achieve this objective. This meant
employing Halifaxes under disadvantageous
conditions. Similarly, cutting back on bomber
production to allow a Lancaster for Halifax
switch was not acceptable to the prime minister,
who never rescinded his demand for quantity.
Fiddling with production schedules was even
more unwanted within the Ministry of Aircraft
Production, which had been struggling since
1940 to meet the Air Ministry’s demands for
numbers. Indeed, it was only in late spring 1943
that the Deputy Director General of Statistics,
Professor Jewkes, believed there was any cause
for optimism within his ministry, and that was
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precisely because, “for the first time since the
war started” the aircraft industry was to be given
“a run of nine to twelve months in which no
major switches in aircraft type” would be called
for. Conditions were therefore ideal for “quantity
production.” As a result, not only was it likely
that the RAF’s requirements would be met in
the near future, but there was also a real
possibility that bomber production in 1944
would exceed what had been called for if
additional labour could be secured.36
Jewkes did not make policy, but his
memorandum reflected opinion within MAP and,
quite probably, within the Cabinet as well. The
Lancaster was not going to be substituted for
the Halifax in the near future. Given what was
happening in the air war, there were reasons to
argue that it should not be. In May of 1943 the
stream tactics adopted by Bomber Command
seemed capable of overwhelming the German
night fighters locked into Kammhuber’s
Himmelbett air defence system, while a start was
being made to support the bomber offensive with
various electronic measures and counter-
measures. Losses might, therefore, be expected
to fall. More to the point, in May 1943 the Halifax
III, about which Harris had been mildly
supportive, had not yet entered squadron
service, and so had neither failed nor succeeded.
Harris, however, was still being influenced
by day-to-day developments suggesting that the
basic Halifax design remained inadequate. On
22 June, for example, having investigated losses
over recent weeks, Bomber Command issued a
report on evading Flak and night-fighters that
highlighted all the known vices of the type.
Acknowledging that mild manoeuvres were
useless, Bomber Command nevertheless warned
its Halifax crews in particular of the risks
involved in taking “violent action.” Heavy or
coarse use of the rudders was known to produce
spins and even complete break-up of the
airframe and as a result pilots were told that
significant “displacement” from straight and level
flight through progressive application of force
on the control surfaces, rather than sudden, high
rates of displacement, should be aimed for.37
Harris was also concerned about the supply
of Halifaxes, new and repaired, and of spares.
“Of all the types of aircraft handled by Bomber
Command,” he told Sinclair:
The Halifax has, during the past eight months,
given us more trouble particularly on the
equipment side than anything else. Furthermore
there has been, and still is, a most deplorable
shortage of Halifax airframe spares and of
ground, handling and servicing equipment,
which causes innumerable difficulties and
serious delays in forming and opening new units
after they have been authorised…we cannot
make full use of a large number of heavy aircraft
if we cannot get adequate supplies of equipment
to service them after they have been taken into
use.38
He complained to Air Chief Marshal Sir
Wilfrid Freeman, now Chief Executive at MAP,
two days later about the lack of progress in the
fin and rudder modifications to be carried out
on all Marks. Bomber Command was losing a
number of crews he explained, because of the
aircraft’s inability to take the evasive manoeuvres
required after a night-fighter attack, and he was
particularly incensed that this modification, the
need for which had been understood for some
time, was being delayed. What’s more, he was
convinced that Handley-Page themselves had
“deliberately dragged out and postponed action
to correct the bad qualities of their aircraft owing
to their urge for production and profit at any
cost.”39
Harris was perhaps being a little unfair.
Handley-Page had large contracts to produce the
Mark III Halifax with the new rudder assembly –
production of which Harris himself had
approved if Halifaxes had to exist at all – and
there were more than 500 Mark IIs and Vs to
retrofit without interfering unduly with aircraft
production or the tempo of Bomber Command
operations. It was, in short, a major undertaking,
and perhaps the commander-in-chief should
have been satisfied that production of the Mark
III was forging ahead.40
For whatever reason, the files are again silent
on the Halifax issue until September 1943, when
Harris once more took up his pen. On 7
September he told Portal that he did not believe
Handley-Page’s promises to fix the “aerodynamic
vices” of the Halifax, and asked that the firm be
dropped. If this were not done, he was convinced
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that the Halifax would soon join the Stirling as
being unfit for deep penetrations. As it was, the
Halifax’s current “mediocre performance” had
only been achieved by disarming the bomber.41
The next day he complained to Freeman:
With regard to the Halifax, that aircraft will be
in the same position in which the Stirling now
is by next Spring at the latest. The average Halifax
already has to bomb at a ceiling of 18,000 feet
or less, and that is nothing like good enough for
hot targets. I have to pull Lancasters down lower
and subject them to a higher casualty rate than
is necessary in order to provide cover and
protection for the Halifax and, when used, the
Stirling.
Meanwhile where the Halifax is concerned we
get, so far, nothing but the usual spate of
unfulfilled promises from the Handley Page
concern. The only “improvements” in the Halifax
we are at present getting are its partial
disarmament (!) and a slightly better coat of
paint, with one or two minor modifications
towards some improvements in its reliability.
If the Halifax cannot be made to go much higher
than it does at the moment, i.e. to work at over
22,000 feet as a normal matter with a reasonable
load, then it is no good going on with it. Its losses
are mounting daily and while a certain
proportion of them are due undoubtedly to the
aerodynamic vices of the aircraft, most of them
are due to its poor performance. Even when it
gets to a target it hauls little, if any, more than
half the load of the Lancaster while putting the
same number of crew in jeopardy.
I do not know whether the new modifications to
the tail so long promised and yet to materialise
will eradicate its vices and make a saving on
casualties from that cause. All past experiences
with the Handley Page concern have long ago
convinced me that none of their promises will
ever materialise and that all their swans are
ducks – or sparrows. But whatever improvement
is to be expected from the new tail the lack of
ceiling of the aircraft is a fatal bar to its long
continued use in the front line.42
 A number of things may have motivated
Harris to write at this time – and to have said
nothing since May. First of all, much of the
summer had been taken up with asking for, and
then planning to use, Window. Secondly, the loss
rate fell immediately after the first Hamburg raid.
And finally, the summer of 1943 saw the first
operations of the Halifax Mark III – whose
performance it would take some time to assess.
By early September, however, the first flush of
success using Window was waning: losses had
mounted by that time and the counter-measure
was clearly not the panacea some had hoped it
would be. In addition, the Halifax Mark III was
proving, in its first operations, not to be another
Lancaster. But neither Freeman nor Portal
accepted Harris’ latest attack. To the former, the
commander-in-chief was simply wrong in
thinking that MAP could supply better aircraft
than Bomber Command was already getting,43
while Portal believed that Harris was being overly
pessimistic. By the middle of 1944, the CAS
pointed out, all the Halifaxes suffering from the
vices Bomber Command was complaining about
would be “out of production.”44
Additional evidence that all was not well with
the Halifax III was not long in coming, as on 21
A 434 Squadron Lancaster X, ‘S for Smitty,’ photographed late in the war.
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September the chief engineer at Bomber
Command reported the first production models
had a maximum ceiling at least three thousand
feet less than advertised,45 forcing them to fly in
lethal Flak and night-fighter zones. Air
Commodore H.J. Roach was not sure what was
wrong – poorly designed air intakes were one
possibility – but inclined to the view that the
Hercules engine’s automatic mixture control was
at fault, causing loss of power at altitude.46 Harris
appears not to have reacted to this information
immediately, but by the end of the October he
was heard from again, by both Sinclair and MAP.
To the former he noted simply that the Halifax
III was a “failure” and almost as useless as the
Stirling.47 To Air Marshal R.S. Sorley, Controller
of Research and Development at MAP, he offered
more technical details. Experienced pilots, he
observed, were reporting ceilings as low as
18,000 feet on the Halifax III, and the only
solution advanced so far – to extend the wing
tips – had been pointed out by Bomber
Command fully a year before but not acted
upon.48 (He was right. Harris had told F.J. Linnell
on 16 October 1942 that the Halifax’s problems
could be traced to the shape of its wing.49) Beyond
this, crews were complaining of temperatures
ranging from -11 to -27 degrees Celsius – much
too severe for accurate work – in the navigation
compartment as compared to a range of -3 to
+20 degrees Celsius in the Lancaster. This too
had been brought to the attention of MAP a year
before, and nothing had been done.50
That the Halifax III could not compare with
the Lancaster I, and maybe not even with the II,
is a common enough assertion supported by
considerable testimonial evidence. For example,
Flying Officer Jim McIntosh has written that
when 432 Squadron RCAF converted from
Lancaster IIs, the worst of that type, to Halifax
IIIs, they went to an aircraft that looked to be
“thrown together rather than designed” and in
which everything was made “to frustrate rather
than aid.” However, McIntosh adds – in a
singularly remarkable account – his Halifax III
reached 25,000 feet easily, and one night he
bombed from 29,000 feet, far above Flak and
most enemy night-fighters – and far higher than
any other Halifax pilot claims to have flown.
Moreover, his crew liked the Halifax’s large
escape hatch.51 There is, in addition, some
evidence that the Halifax may have been more
robust than the Lancaster – and less likely to
burst into flame if hit.
By late 1943, however, with the Battle of
Berlin raging and bomber losses climbing
steadily, Harris was not likely to be persuaded
by anyone favouring the Halifax. He had a grudge
against Handley-Page anyway, and was unwilling
to accept that anything useful was likely to
emerge from that concern. What was important
now, given the resurgence of the German air
defences, was the safety of his crews, and that
could be served best, in his view, only if they
were flying Lancasters. Accordingly, on 2
December he approached Freeman again,
repeating many of the old arguments about the
vulnerability of the Halifax, but also picking up,
more firmly than before, Lord Cherwell’s claim
that Halifaxes were not cost-effective. Lancasters
he declared, would always be able to carry 5,000
pounds more payload than the Halifax over any
range or the same weight of bombs five hundred
miles further. As a result, he felt confident
asserting that:
One Lancaster is to be preferred to four
Halifaxes. That Halifaxes are an embarrassment
now and will be useless for the bomber offensive
within six months if not before. That all attempts
to boost up the Halifax to Lancaster class will
fail – if only because the Lancaster will by then
be boosted beyond the class at which the Halifax
has long aimed and always fallen far short of. I
issued the same warning about the Stirling. It is
now useless and flooding the market. I cannot
too strongly warn you yet again that a
continuance on Halifaxes leads us straight and
soon for disaster.52
An Operational Research Section study then
underway at High Wycombe (but not issued until
February) confirmed what Harris was saying
when it found that the loss rate for Halifaxes
was not dropping despite the adoption of the
larger, rectangular tail fin.53 Read one way, the
data supported his contention that the tail and
rudder modifications carried out over the past
half year had not decreased the Halifax’s
vulnerability and that, as a heavy bomber, the
type was beyond repair. It would stink forever.
But there is a flaw in his logic – the same
flaw that permeates the whole Halifax story when
it is seen exclusively from Harris’s point of view.
The reason why the Halifax loss rate loss was
not falling during the Battle of Berlin was not
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that the rectangular fin made no difference,
but rather because Bomber Command was
attacking difficult, distant targets defended by
a Luftwaffe night fighter force recovering
quickly from the impact of Window and other
electronic counter-measures. Playing with
statistics is a fool’s game, but had Bomber
Command been doing something else during
the winter of 1943-1944, a drop in the Halifax
loss rate might well have occurred, in which
case the pre-existing bias against the type
would have been less easy to support with so-
called mathematical precision. But once Harris
was committed to the Battle of Berlin, loss rates
had to climb, and the bias against the Halifax
was confirmed. That, in turn, served to deflect
attention away from a second question, which
probably should have been asked first. Allowing
that the Halifax was less than ideal, would an
all-Lancaster force have been able to sustain
these operations at significantly less risk? In
short, because of the prejudice against the
Halifax, confirmed nightly over central
Germany, it was easier to blame Bomber
Command’s failure to meet its objective on the
Halifax’s mediocrity than to question whether,
with the resources at hand, the Battle of Berlin
was a reasonable operation of war having any
chance of success. (See Tables 2 & 3).
Perhaps because of this, Harris ’s
singleminded campaign against the Halifax began
to bear fruit that December. In the middle of the
month, the Deputy Director Organization
(Planning) felt compelled to examine again the
effect of abandoning the Halifax, and did so
without questioning the essential validity of
Harris’s charges against the type. Rather, he
explained, if substituting Lancasters for Halifaxes
was not possible, the Air Ministry’s reply should
be based on the fact that production would fall
by 1,000 bombers should the switch to
Lancasters be made – which amounted to ten
squadrons or, looked at another way, 29,500 tons
of bombs that would not be dropped on
Germany. To his credit, the DDO (P) admitted
that “what we cannot answer is the fact that some
of the loss” he was projecting would be “offset
by increased efficiency of an all Lancaster force,”
although just how much he did not hazard a
guess, but this did not matter. Any change in the
production schedule made in December 1943
would have had no impact until 1945 at the
* includes a high proportion of Gardening operations and those involving shallow penetrations.
** if losses in 431 and 434 Squadrons are ignored, the 6 Group loss rate is only 4.7%.
Source: 6 Group Operational Research Section, Addendum to review of bomber losses in night operations with
special reference to No. 6 (R.C.A.F.) Group, 13 January 1944, DHH 181.003 (D4223)
Source: Ibid.
Table 2
Table 3
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earliest, and Cabinet had decreed that
manpower should not be wasted on projects
whose effect would not be felt before 1945.54
This good, safe, bureaucratic reasoning was
reinforced at a special meeting convened on 21
December to discuss the future of the Halifax.
Harris, of course, told a familiar story, except
that instead of discussing this or that specific
problem associated with the Halifax, for which
solutions might be found, he dismissed the
aircraft altogether. Nothing was wrong with it,
he said, except its “inherent vices,” vices that
would prevent it from ever flying above 20,000
feet. Undoubtedly reflecting his own weariness
with the issue, the Controller of Research and
Development, Air Marshal Sorley, responded
simply that the Halifax III and VII, while not as
good as the Lancaster, would be better than any
previous Halifax – which was really no answer
at all. Portal, ever the diplomat, announced that
he would like to see a switch in production made,
but that this was not an easy thing to manage.
Halifaxes, meanwhile, could do useful work
against less distant targets. This was an
important consideration, he added, if 1944 was
the crucial year in the war, in which case it was
not the time to inflict a five to six month loss in
bomber output on the air force.
Freeman was less helpful. No matter how
desirable it might have been, a switch in
production from the Halifax to the Lancaster was
not possible, he said, because the aircraft
industry did not have the necessary jigs, an
argument confirmed in general terms, by Corelli
Barnett. For once Harris seems to have listened,
as by the end of the meeting he was not only
Halifax aircraft of RAF Bomber Command cross the coast near Calais, France during a daylight attack in support of the
Canadian operation to capture Calais, 25 September 1944.
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talking in terms of specific problems relating
to the Halifax, but also suggesting solutions to
them. The main fault with the aircraft was still
its low ceiling, he stated, and Bomber Command
itself would do everything it could to help,
including the removal of the front turret.55 As a
result, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff
(Technical Requirements), Air Vice-Marshal J.D.
Breakey, who had been upset by Harris’s
continuing criticism of the Halifax, was hopeful
that at last agreement had been reached “that
there is absolutely no point in continuing the
interminable arguments on the relative
performance of the various marks of Halifax or
Lancasters.”56 The Halifax was mediocre, but its
mediocrity was irrelevant.
Still, doubts about the Halifax’s future
remained. At a meeting of the Defence Committee
(Supply) held on 3 January 1944 Sir Archibald
Sinclair explained that, although the Air Ministry
was bound by War Cabinet decisions to “ensure
the maximum impact” of bombing on the enemy
in 1944, and despite the fact that “a large
proportion” of the bomber force was composed
of Halifaxes, he was “prepared to pay a heavy
price in Halifaxes” to “see a greater production
of Lancasters.” Sir Stafford Cripps replied that
although he was aware of this, a decrease in
Halifax production would not in itself increase
output of Lancasters. Moreover, he continued,
returning to an old theme, the data upon which
discussion had been based related primarily to
outdated marks of the Halifax, not the III or IV,
whose performance should be substantially
better.
Lord Cherwell, always a supporter of the
Lancaster, did not agree. “If more labour were
made available,” he argued, “it seemed clear that
the output of Lancasters could be increased,”
particularly if better use could be made of factory
space. Already the hours worked on the second
shifts were less than the first, and he was
“inclined to think that there was scope for an
increase of up to 50% if existing capacity were
worked to the full.” Moreover, since the Halifax
was “only one-third as effective as the
Lancaster…it would be better to increase
Lancasters at the expense of Halifaxes, even if it
meant using a large quantity of labour somewhat
inefficiently to do so.”
There was some room for inefficiency in
manufacturing Lancasters, as the DDGPS at MAP
was able to show the following May (See Table 4).
Sir Stafford Cripps countered that Cherwell’s
suggestions involved amending the official
“designation” of the Halifax as a priority item and
explained that if its status was reduced, it would
be subject, by law, to serve constraints on the
allocation of labour and raw materials.
Production would probably fall below the levels
Cherwell had anticipated. More to the point, he
added, output in the Lancaster plants could not
be increased, “because the machine shops
producing components… were [already] working
150 hours a week. To make any appreciable
difference… it would be necessary to bring in a
great deal more capacity right down the line.”
Mr. Bevin, Minister of Labour agreed with
Cripps. Anyway downward revision of the
Halifax’s designated status would create an
impression “among all who had to work the
administrative machinery for supplying labour”
that “it had sunk into the class of aircraft to
which no particular importance was attached.”
“This would be psychologically unfortunate,” he
continued, and “would inevitably lead to a
decrease in output of Halifaxes.” Therefore, he
concluded, putting forward a compromise, “the
right course would be to explain to all concerned
that while both were of the greatest importance,
the Lancaster was the more important of the
Source: DDGPS memorandum, “Labour absorption estimates,” 20 May 1944, TNA PRO AVIA, 10/269 (3/4 of way
through).
Table 4
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two.” His colleagues accepted this formulation
on the understanding that “the Lancaster would
be placed in a category by itself – the Halifax,
Spitfire, and Mosquito being also designated, and
placed equal to each other but below the
Lancaster.”57
Two days later Sir Wilfrid Freeman contacted
the Lancaster plants, attempting to “squeeze…
the absolute maximum” out of them. Their
answers were ready on 18 January. So long as
additional machine tools could be found, A.V.
Roe estimated that it could make an extra 67,
Metropolitan Vickers 27, Armstrong Whitworth
40, Vickers Armstrong 10, and Austin Aero 3.
This would mean that 1,928 Lancaster IIIs and
1,369 Lancaster IVs would appear between
January 1944 and December 1945.58
Sinclair, meanwhile, was beginning to have
doubts about the statements he had made to the
Defence Committee (Supply) a few days before.
Having defended the Halifax on the assumption
that the Mark III was demonstrably better than
the II or V, he was “shocked” to discover, speaking
to members of the Pathfinder Force, that some
IIIs, at least, seemed not to enjoy a 20 mph
advantage in speed, or a 2,000 foot advantage in
ceiling. He quickly sought reassurance from
Portal that his original briefing was correct, and
that the Halifax III was not as bad as the
Pathfinders’ experience seemed to suggest. On
the other hand, he accepted their “interesting”
advice that because of improvements to the
German Flak – 105 mm guns were replacing 88s
– a few thousand feet in ceiling made little
difference. The German guns, he was told, fired
“with great accuracy” to 30,000 feet – higher than
any British heavy bomber could fly.59
In his reply, Portal told Sinclair that “the
information given to you in the first place” was
“correct” despite the fact that a table comparing
the Halifax III with the II showed a service ceiling
advantage for the former of only two hundred
feet. The crucial difference was that at 20,000
feet the Mark II had only a four miles per hour
gap between its minimum and maximum
cruising speeds, while that of the III was 22. Even
at 18,000 feet, the gap for the Halifax II was only
ten miles per hour, while that for the Halifax III
was 31. This meant that from 18,000 feet up,
the III had a reserve of power lacking in the II,
and which forces most Mark IIs to fly lower.60
This answer satisfied Sinclair.61
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A Lancaster of Bomber Command adds its payload of cluster bombs
to the target area, Hannover, Germany, 25 March 1945.
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On 24 January the Directorate of Bomber
Operations at the Air Ministry offered its opinion,
arguing that Bomber Command had “found that
improvements in performance over the Halifax
II have in fact been realised in practice.” Indeed,
the superiority of the Mark III was even greater
than forecast, with operational ceilings turning
out to be 22,000 feet compared to 18,500 for
the Mark II. Moreover, it was flying 15 miles per
hour faster. This additional height and
manoeuvrability along with improved flame
dampers “should,” in DB Ops’ view, “result in
an improvement in the casualty rates.” For the
moment, however, based on only 181 Mark III
sorties, the Mark III was actually doing worse
than the II and the Lancaster, the casualty rates
standing at 10 percent, 8.8 percent and 4.2
percent.62
On 27 January, probably as background for
another meeting of the Defence Committee
(Supply), the Directorate of Bomber Operations
presented a more complete evaluation and
defence of the Halifax III. Accepting Churchill’s
reasoning that “the weight of bombs dropped per
aircraft missing” was the “true measure” of
relative value, the statistics presented were
hardly comforting.  (See Table 5).
Yet DB Ops insisted on making the best
possible case for the Halifax. The type compared
favourably with the American bombers, he noted,
further improvements. Moreover, with the
coming of summer distant attacks would be
made less frequently, which meant that there
should be fewer losses to fighters. Accordingly,
the Halifax could be expected to pay “a very good
dividend.” Even the Mark II was doing well “in
conditions of shallow penetration and lightly
defended targets,” and on this account perhaps
all Halifaxes could be used for army support after
the invasion, reserving the Lancaster for strategic
work. Accordingly, the Halifax would be
“indispensable…until the end of this summer.”63
Here was a reasonable operational
justification for the Halifax – one that was as
sensible as Harris’s suggestion in November
1942 that Halifaxes be limited to relatively easy
operations. So long as there was no intensive
campaign of area bombing against the cities of
Germany, it seemed that the Halifax could be a
useful machine after all. The recommendation
was accepted by the Defence Committee (Supply)
that same day. Over the summer, Lancasters
would be used on deep penetration raids, and
the Halifaxes set aside for “the heavy bomber
tasks connected with ‘OVERLORD’.” This
decision made even more sense given Sir
Stafford Cripps’ statement that factory space
would not permit more Lancasters to be made
and that, in any event, additional Merlin engines
could not be found.64
Source: J.M. Whitworth (for DB Ops) to P.S. to S. of S., 24 January 1944, TNA PRO AIR 19/352.
Table 5
and there was reason to expect a higher
performance from the Halifax through the year.
The improvements already made in the Mark III
version had placed it “almost on a level with the
existing Lancaster types for performance (except
for weight of bombs carried)” and that should
reduce future losses. The Halifax IV, expected in
September, was once again expected to show
Two months were to pass before the end of
the Battle of Berlin and the beginning of pre-
invasion bombing – two months in which
Bomber Command losses remained dangerously
high, and those of the Halifax II and V squadrons
unacceptably so. They were withdrawn from
operations after the raid on Leipzig, 19/20
February, when the overall Halifax loss rate was
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13.3 percent.65 One might have expected Harris’
outrage to take over during this period, but
nothing in the files suggests this. I found no
memoranda to Portal, Sinclair, or Freeman of
any importance on the subject of the Halifax;
and there is no crowing over the end of Halifax
II/V operations. At the worst time of the war,
Bomber Command’s chief, unaccountably, was
not lashing out.
There was, of course, still concern about the
numbers of bombers being lost, and ways to
avoid casualties (short of calling off the battle)
were still being sought. The need to provide
better escape hatches received considerable
attention following a thorough investigation of
prisoner of war records (provided by the
Germans and the Red Cross) which indicated
that of the 6,498 aircrew missing between
January and June 1943, only 1,209 (19 percent)
were known to have survived. For once there was
no reason to complain about the Halifax, as its
aircrew survival rate was the best of all heavy
bombers. The Lancaster, with its small front
escape hatch, its poor rear exit, and its
propensity to break up in mid-air, was the worst.
A call therefore went out to provide the Lancaster
with a floor hatch and to redesign all others so
that they would not jam because of air and wind
pressure.66
(These opinions were confirmed by a second
ORS study issued in September. This found that
one reason why many aircrew had not been able
to leave their aircraft was that far too often the
escape hatch was caught in the slipstream and
forced back into a position where it blocked the
hatchway. On 7 September 1944, therefore, the
ORS recommended that if modifications were
not made to the assembly, crews should be told
not to jettison the escape hatch cover, as was
originally the case, but to throw it out of the way
inside the aircraft.)67
This was also a time when considerable effort
was being made to up-gun the heavy bomber,
not only to provide additional protection at night,
but also for defence against the day fighters that
would be encountered during army support
operations on the continent. Installing heavier
guns and turrets was a problem in all bombers,
but particularly so in the Halifax, which was
always near the limit of its power to weight
equation. Thus when 4 Group attempted to fit a
.5-inch under-gun mounting in March 1944 (on
operations against Frankfurt) they found that the
Halifax’s performance above 20,000 feet fell off
sharply [indirect testimony that it would fly that
high routinely?] while the gunner suffered from
“extreme cold.”68 Moreover, refinements to the
original fitting made during the month
accomplished little. Tests of the .5-inch mounting
conducted on 18/19 March recorded
temperatures of -21 degrees Celsius, and found
that the gunner’s range of vision was limited
because he had to sit too far back to get a good
view. In addition, to maintain acceptable flight
standards, 4 Group concluded that 500-600
pounds of bombs would have to be sacrificed.
The AOC, Air Vice-Marshal Carr, concluded, as
a result, that “the disadvantages of this
mounting” so outweighed the advantages that
its introduction should be “discontinued.”69
Later in March Bomber Command ’s
operational research section concluded that,
because of its vulnerability and smaller
bombload, it took 2.6 Halifaxes to equal one
Lancaster.70  (See Table 6).
From 6 Group, meanwhile, came word that
the accident rate in Halifax III squadrons was
double that of the Lancaster II/V. This was
surprising since the III was supposed to be more
air-worthy than the II or V, but 6 Group had an
explanation ready. The accident rate could be
blamed on the fact that recent conversions to
the III, rather than on “any insuperable defects
in the aircraft itself.” The justification for this
came from 433 Squadron, veterans on the
Halifax III, whose pilots had a very low accident
rate.71
It was not until the end of March that I can
find evidence of Harris’s personal involvement
in the Halifax question, when he again sent
papers to both Portal and Freeman making the
most of the Operational Research Section’s
comparison of his two heavy bombers. The ratio
of 2.6:1 was actually kind to the Halifax, he
explained, because it did not take into account
specific tactical dispositions he had been making
(to its “further discredit”) to save Halifax crews.
Halifaxes were “deliberately and necessarily”
placed in the bomber stream so that they would
not only receive additional protection from the
bundles of Window dropped by the Lancasters
above, but also so that they would be “wrapped
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up” in a Lancaster blanket on the flanks, in front,
and to the rear – a formation that undoubtedly
increased casualties among Lancaster crews. The
commander-in-chief concluded that, unless the
Luftwaffe had been defeated, none of his
Halifaxes would be useful come the fall.72
Portal was in no mood to pursue this matter
further. In his directive to the ACAS (TR) he
advised that Harris was to be told that the Air
Ministry was also keeping a careful accounting
of bomber losses, and that after having done
everything possible the ratio between Lancaster
and Halifax production in the future would be
no better than three to two. One might hope that
the Luftwaffe would be so weakened that the
Halifax III could still be used over Germany, but
if not Portal was prepared to rely on Harris’ 300
Lancasters to carry the war to Germany, leaving
the Halifaxes for operational training, Gardening,
and shallow penetrations into France. The CAS
assumed that Harris would see the wisdom of
this argument, and that he would agree that it
was a waste to employ Lancasters against easy
targets.73 As Harris had forecast in November
1942, and the Defence Committee (Supply) had
agreed in January, the time had come to divide
the bomber force into two.
At this point the story-line to the Halifax
controversy disappears. From the files I have
seen, Harris made no further interventions –
convinced, probably, that his campaign to rid
Bomber Command of the Halifax had failed. At
the same time, Bomber Command’s losses fell
dramatically from 1 April 1944, so that the
statistical bias against the Halifax disappeared
somewhat. Indeed, 5 Group probably suffered
more casualties from this time on because of
the nature of the targets it was assigned – and 5
Group flew Lancasters. But some interesting bits
of information on the Halifax and Lancaster have
emerged from the files – bits that we should be
familiar with before we begin to write our
operational narratives. I just ask for some
forebearance on account of the choppiness of
the last few pages of this narrative.
One thing that emerged over the summer of
1944, for example, was that in a number of
respects the Halifax was a more robust aircraft
than the Lancaster once either had been hit by
Flak or by a night-fighter. This contradicted
earlier suggestions about Halifax vulnerability,
but the evidence is compelling. Bomber
Command’s Operational Research Section noted
on 28 June that on the basis of examining 24,000
Halifax sorties and 11,000 Lancaster sorties, it
was clear that the hydraulic turrets on the latter
were four to five times more likely to be put out
of action than the electro-hydraulic system in
the Halifax’s Boulton Paul turrets.74
No.6 Group studies conducted later in the
summer indicated that Hercules engines on the
Halifax were better protected than the Merlins
on the Lancaster, whose coolant systems were
notoriously prone to battle damage.75 However,
one observer who toured 6 Group found that
the Halifax was not well loved. “The boys do know
the score between the two aircraft, tho’ only in a
general way,” Reinke commented in his diary on
21 July. For public consumption, the crews of
426 Squadron were claiming that the
Source: DCAS to Secretary of State, 4 April 1944, TNA PRO AIR 19/352, citing Bomber Command data.
Table 6
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Canadian Squadrons
and Halifax Aircraft
405 Squadron flew Halifax II from April 1942 to
September 1943
408 Squadron flew Halifax V from August 1942 to
December 1942; Halifax II from December 1942
to August 43, when it switched to Lancasters;
returned to Halifax III July 1944
415 Squadron flew Halifax III from July 1944
419 Squadron flew Halifax II from November 1942
until April 1944
420 Squadron flew Halifax III from December 1943
until May 1945
424 Squadron flew Halifax III from December 1943
to January 1945
425 Squadron flew Halifax III from Janaury 1944 to
May 1945
426 Squadron flew Halifax III from April 1944 to May
1945, but was also equipped with Halifax VII
from June 1944
427 Squadron flew Halifax V from May 1943 to
February 1944, then Halifax III until March 1945,
then Lancaster I
428 Squadron flew Halifax V from June 1943 until
June 1944, but also had Halifax II from
November 1943 to June 1944. May have had
Halifax III until Februray 1945, when it switched
to Lancaster I
Canadian Squadrons
and Lancaster Aircraft
405 Squadron flew Lancasters from 1943
408 Squadron flew Lancasters July 43 to July 1944
419 Squadron flew Lancasters from spring 1944
420 Squadron flew Lancasters from April 1945
424 Squadron flew Lancasters from January 1945
427 Squadron flew Lancasters from February 1944
428 Squadron flew Lancasters from February 1944
431 Squadron flew Lancasters from October 1944
433 Squadron flew Lancasters from January 1945
434 Squadron flew Lancasters from December 1944
429 Squadron flew Halifax II from August 1943 to
January 1944 but also had Halifax V from
November 1943 to March 1944; then Halifax III
to March 1945
431 Squadron flew Halifax V from July 1943, then
Halifax III from March 1944 to October 1944
432 Squadron flew Halifax III from February 1944
to May 1945 but also had Halifax VII from June
1944
433 Squadron flew Halifax III from November 1943
to February 1945
434 Squadron flew Halifax V from June 1943 to May
1944, Halifax III from May 1944 to December
1944
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modifications introduced on the Halifax VII had
made it almost as good as the Lancaster; but
at night, in the bar, they made clear their
“dislike and fear of the Halifax” although they
admitted it was more spacious, inside, than
the Lancaster.76
The British official history has dealt with
the problems raised by the possibility of an all-
Mosquito bomber force. Crowding the night sky,
and the likelihood that the Germans would have
found some way to attack the Mosquito, are the
arguments put forward by Webster and
Frankland against a Mosquito force. The
problem was addressed in the Air Ministry in
June 1944, and additional reasons were found
to downplay the idea. For one thing, Mosquitoes
were in demand everywhere, which meant that
there were not enough to allocate to every
command in the numbers wanted. Secondly,
although it had clear advantages over the heavy
bomber, it did not carry a useful load of high
explosives and incendiaries to mount area
attacks in which 70 per cent of the damage
was caused by fire.77 Finally, I have found two
fascinating items on Lancaster production. One
is dated 2 June 1944, and is a memorandum
from Professor Jewkes (DDGPS) to the Chief
Executive, MAP. The memo points out that the
argument that cuts to Halifax production would
not necessarily free labour for the Lancaster was
misleading. With American propellers and
engines on hand, and reserves of undercarriages
and avionics, increased production was, in fact,
almost guaranteed. The only areas where there
might be problems was the turrets, which were
different, and in which industry there was no
surplus.78 But the cut in labour allocations to
the aircraft industry made later that summer
effectively squelched any such shift.79  Bomber
Command would fly the Halifax, whatever its
faults, until VE-Day.
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